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INTRODUCTION

DIASPORAS, UNSTABLE IDENTITIES, AND NIKKEI DISCOURSE

To feel at home is to know that things are in their places and so are you; it is a state of mind that doesn't depend on an actual location. The object of longing, then, is not really a place called home but this sense of intimacy in the world.

(Svetlana Boym 251)

It is 5 August 2016. Thanks to the opening ceremony of the Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games directed by Brazilian filmmaker Fernando Meirelles, the world learns about Brazil's convoluted history: in a spectacle leaning toward inclusive and pluralistic multiculturalism, numerous actors recognize the valuable contributions of indigenous people, Europeans, Africans, Middle Easterners, and Asians to Brazilian society. "Donald Trump will 'hate' the Rio Olympics opening ceremony" (n.p.), stated Meirelles. Yet only the suffering of Africans is acknowledged through the cement-looking blocks on their feet as they walk through the stadium; by contrast, actors carrying big, red, leaf-shaped flags evoke a sanitized version of the arrival of the first Japanese immigrants to Brazilian shores. Three members of the 2016 Brazilian



FIGURE 1.1. Japanese immigrant family in Japan (collection of the Historical Museum of Japanese Immigration in Brazil).

Olympic team are of Japanese origin: the runner Mahau Camargo Sugimati; the rugby player Paula Harumi Ishibashi; and the judoka Charles Koshiro Chibana, who still speaks Japanese at home with his parents. But who are these Nikkeijin? This book provides a glimpse into the Japanese Brazilian world through a focus on Nikkei history, discourse, and Lusophone cultural production in Brazil and Japan since the 1980s. As will be seen, “multiculturalism” is a more elusive term in Japan, a country that until recently has been proud of its ethnic homogeneity and where only 2 percent of the population was born overseas.¹ However, Ryoko Tsuneyoshi and Kaori H. Okano point out that “Japan has been a multi-ethnic and multicultural entity since pre-modern times, as studies have challenged the popular image of homogeneity and advanced what might be called a ‘multicultural Japan’ thesis” (1). Even though Japan is not known for receiving immigrants, it does boast the second-largest Brazilian community outside of Brazil. Yet, in order to be



FIGURE 1.2. Japanese workers in the banana harvest in Brazil (collection of the Historical Museum of Japanese Immigration in Brazil).

admitted as immigrant workers, they must have Japanese ancestry or be married to Nikkeijin, an inherently racist policy endorsed by both the Japanese and the Brazilian governments.

The study of the Asian presence and heritage in Latin America, together with that of cultural production by Asians of Latin American ancestry, is an emerging academic field. Numerous books, articles, journal issues, dissertations, conferences, symposia, workshops, and new journals have been devoted to these topics in recent years. In the field of history alone, six books about the Asian presence in Mexico have been published in as many years.² Along these lines, in the field of literary and cultural analysis, several books on orientalism in Latin America and the Caribbean have also been published as well as studies on cultural production by Latin American authors of Asian descent, the representation of Asians in Latin American literature, or literary and cultural relations between Latin America and Asia.³ As to the specific study of Japanese immigration and settlement in Latin America and the Caribbean, more than one hundred volumes have been published since the pioneering historical studies by C. Harvey Gardiner, James L. Tigner, Iyo Kunimoto, and



FIGURE 1.3. Japanese immigrants arriving in Brazil (collection of the Historical Museum of Japanese Immigration in Brazil).

María Elena Ota Mishima. Many other scholars have also explored the Asian experience in Brazil and in other Latin American countries.⁴

This book, a new contribution to the field of Asians in the Americas and a continuation of my 2013 *The Affinity of the Eye: Writing Nikkei in Peru*, studies, for the most part, self-definition and Nikkei discourse in Portuguese-language cultural production by Brazilian authors of Japanese ancestry. This




FIGURE 1.4. *Kasato Maru* (first ship to bring Japanese immigrants to Brazil) (collection of the Historical Museum of Japanese Immigration in Brazil).

study also analyzes complementary cultural production about Brazilian Nikkeijin written or directed by Japanese (from Japan) and non-Nikkei Brazilians. Therefore, whereas other critics have explored Japanese-language fiction written in Brazil, I will focus mainly on Portuguese-language works and films by Nikkei authors and filmmakers.

Although there are also many Japanese-language texts related to the Brazilian Nikkeijin, they are not the main object of study here, other than the Japanese-language and bilingual films analyzed; however, as stated, several other scholars are currently engaging with this important body of work from the perspective of Japanese Studies, often focusing on Issei literature, which was produced mostly in Japanese and encouraged by Japanese-language immigrant newspapers through prose fiction literary prizes and other means. Other institutions, such as the Bunkyo,⁵ founded in 1955 in the Liberdade neighborhood of São Paulo—which serves as cultural center, museum, library, and mutual assistance society—as well as the literary and cultural association Brasil Nikkei Bungaku, founded in 1966, have promoted the publication of both Japanese- and Portuguese-language prose, poetry, and other modes of cultural production as a way to record and

articulate a Nikkei collective memory in Brazil and to promote Brazilian culture in Japan.

Regarding these types of studies in the United States, a recent workshop organized by Seth Jacobowitz, titled “Japan and Brazil: Immigrant Literature and Transnational Migration Workshop,” dealt with Japanese literature written in and about Argentina, Brazil, and Peru mostly from the perspective of Japanese Studies. It took place at Yale University on 10 April 2015 and brought together several scholars in the field, including the historian Jeffrey Lesser, who lectured about postwar Japanese Brazilian identity, and literary critics Andrew Leong, who talked about postwar Japanese Peruvian cultural production, Edward Mack, Zelideth Rivas, and Seth Jacobowitz. These last three critics maintained that Japanese immigrants saw their own work as fundamentally connected to their homeland and native language, but with particular “colonial” (*shokumin*) characteristics specific to their Brazilian experience. As to the formation of Japanese Studies in Brazil, Henrique Altemani de Oliveira and Gilmar Masiero have published a detailed study of its history and challenges.⁶

The focus and *locus* of enunciation of this book are then different from those studies on Japanese-language Nikkei immigrant literature (*imin bungaku*) currently being undertaken in the area of Japanese Studies, which are trying to incorporate these works into the Japanese literary canon. Indeed, Japanese Brazilian writing began with the inception of the immigration process since—as the Nikkei *haijin* (haiku poet), farmer, shopkeeper, journalist, and painter H. (Hidekazu) Masuda Goga (1911–2008) claims—the first poems and diaries were written onboard the *Kasato Maru*, the ship that brought the first Japanese immigrants to the port of Santos in 1908 (33).⁷ As early as the 1910s, Japanese newspapers began to be published, a venue for the publication of Japanese-language haiku (called *haikai* in Brazil) and other forms of traditional poetry such as *tanka* (“short-form verse”) by these immigrants, who introduced new *kigo* (a word or phrase that indicates the particular season to which the stanza refers) to reflect Brazilian nature (Rocha 207).⁸ However, my interdisciplinary training in Latin American literary and cultural studies leads me to focus instead on Portuguese-language works, which I consider Brazilian—rather than Japanese—cultural production, since in this book I argue that descendants of Japanese in Brazil should be treated as Brazilians rather than as foreigners.

In this study, I argue that most, if not all, of the Portuguese-language works herein analyzed should be considered Brazilian (and by extension, Latin American) cultural production, rather than Japanese literature, particularly when considering authors born in Brazil. In fact, the veiled goal of many of them is precisely to claim the right to belong within the Brazilian national project. By focusing mostly on Portuguese-language texts and films written and directed by Japanese Brazilian authors and filmmakers, rather than on the Nikkeijin as a literary object of study, I hope to bring to the fore this ethnic group's voice and agency to historicize its own experience. I am especially interested in the Nikkei community's progressive delinking from Japan (the homeland for first-generation Issei and the ancestral land for their descendants) and the progressive identification with the host country and its national history, mainstream culture, language, and society.

I refer to Japanese residing overseas and their descendants through terms such as "Nikkei" or "Nikkeijin." Although, as Daniel M. Masterson and Sakaya Funada-Cassen explain, "The Japanese government legally recognizes that people are of 'Japanese descent' if their [Japanese] lineage can be traced back three generations" (xi), in my research I use "Nikkei" or "Nikkeijin" to refer to all persons who have one or more ancestors from Japan or who define themselves as Nikkeijin. This term, which generally refers to the Japanese overseas (first-generation Issei, second-generation Nisei, third-generation Sansei, fourth generation Yonsei, fifth generation Gosei), has been increasingly used in Latin America since the late 1980s. These terms, whether in Japanese or in Portuguese, tend to indicate the degree of separation from the pioneering Issei who began the immigration process. As expected, the assumption is that the farther removed the characters are, the more integrated they will be into Brazilian mainstream culture and the less they will identify with their ancestral Japanese culture.

Further complicating the nomenclature, as Takeyuki Tsuda points out, though Brazilians of Japanese heritage (Nikkei Burajirujin in Japanese) often call themselves "Japanese" in Brazil, those who have "returned" to their ancestral homeland "call themselves 'brasileiros' [Brazilians] in Japan" (*Strangers* 50), when they move to that country as *dekasegi* (temporary workers, normally spelled *decasségui* in Portuguese). Although Japanese Issei who moved to Brazil at the beginning of the twentieth century were also considered *dekasegi*, in this book I use the term, in the Brazilian sense, only to refer

to migrant Brazilian Nikkei laborers in Japan.⁹ And although most dekasegi (their non-Nikkei spouses are also considered dekasegi) are, of course, also Nikkeijin, I use this last term to refer mainly to Japanese Brazilians living in Brazil (or to all Japanese Brazilians).

Jeffrey Lesser also clarifies that Brazilians of immigrant ancestry rarely use hyphenated demonyms, preferring Japanese to Japanese Brazilian or Italian to Italian American, for example (*Immigration* 3). To avoid confusion, this study uses synonyms to refer to this ethnic group that are more in line with US nomenclature for ethnic minorities, such as Japanese Brazilians and Brazilian Nikkeijin. In any case, as Tsuda explains: “Japanese Brazilian ethnic terminology is quite complex, diverse, and confusing, indicating the ambiguous nature of their ethnicity and their constantly shifting identities. In addition to ‘Japanese Brazilian’ (*nipo-brasileiro*, in Portuguese, or less commonly *japonês-brasileiro*), a multitude of other terms are used, including ‘japonês,’ ‘brasileiro,’ ‘descendente’ (or ‘descendente japonês’), as well as the Japanese generational terms ‘issei,’ ‘nisei,’ ‘sansei,’ depending on the location, the social situation, and the context of speech” (*Strangers* 49–50). Although less commonly used, there is an additional term, *para-nisseis*, which refers to “Japanese immigrants who arrived in Brazil when they were still children and received the same education as Nisei.”¹⁰ This diverse and rich terminology reflects the connections between language and subjectivity, cultural differences, and multiple Japanese Brazilian identities, as well as a heterogeneity that is often bypassed in interpretations that exoticize or essentialize this population.

While Brazilian literature has a significant number of fictional and non-fictional works including and addressing Portuguese, Italian, German, and Jewish immigration, not until recently did writers and scholars focus on works dealing with Japanese immigration or written by Brazilian Nikkeijin. Thus, as late as 1984, Katsuzō Yamamoto (1909–), in his 1984 collection of essays *Toda uma Vida no Brasil* (An Entire Life in Brazil, originally published in Japanese in 1973 under the title *Burajiru to gojūshichinen*), laments the Nikkeijin’s purported lack of interest in producing cultural artifacts: “It is true that our contribution to agrarian development has been acknowledged by Brazilians. They have also recognized Japanese companies’ contribution to Brazil’s industrial development. But how about the cultural arena? I am not trying to say that nothing or very little. Would the Japanese and their descendants be able to leave something of which Brazilians could be proud

abroad? I feel a certain sadness when I look for ‘proof’ of the participation of the Japanese in Brazilian cultural life that may have left a mark.”¹¹ This study constitutes an attempt to demonstrate that the landscape of Nikkei cultural production has changed dramatically since Yamamoto made this discouraging remark.

By contrast, from a historical and sociological perspective, Japanese immigration to Brazil has been thoroughly studied. According to historian Jerry García, there are approximately one hundred books exploring Japanese immigration in Latin America (6). Even Claude Lévi-Strauss, in the twelfth chapter of his 1964 *Tristes tropiques*, titled “Towns and Countryside,” focuses on the Japanese in Brazil:

There were also a lot of Japanese around São Paulo, but they were more difficult to approach . . . The fact that it was extremely difficult to gain access to the offices of the Kaigai-Iju Jumiai, or to the Brazil-Takahoka-Kuaiami, and even more so to get inside the agricultural centers themselves and the almost clandestine network of hotels, hospitals, brickworks and sawmills ensuring the self-sufficiency of the colony, proved the existence of deeply laid plans which had two very different but interconnected consequences: the segregation of the colonists at carefully selected points, and the pursuit (coincidental with the opening up of the land) of archaeological research intended to stress certain analogies between pre-Columbian remains and those of the Japanese Neolithic period. (109–10)

Lévi-Strauss never explains what he means when stating that the inland farms where the Japanese lived were half military camps—it is unclear whether he means that the immigrants at times worked under the supervision of armed foremen, as in the early days, or whether instead he is describing the militarization of the Japanese lifestyle. In this brief passage, however, he notes the isolated, segregated, hermetic, and almost secret nature of these self-sufficient enclaves, as well as the deadly diseases to which workers were exposed. He also notices the Japanese immigrants’ desire to return to their native land and their failure to adapt to the local environment, though the towns were developed “so as to give the feeling of never having left Japan” (109). More interestingly, he points out the Japanese minority’s early attempts to find a justification for their national belonging in Brazil: through archaeological research, these immigrants were trying to connect native tribes in

Brazil with ancient Japanese populations. Lesser has also drawn attention to these attempts, explaining that Japanese immigrants negotiated their places in Brazil not only through economic success, but also through cultural approaches: "One theory suggested that the Amazonian indigenous people were a lost tribe of Japanese . . . The hypothesis that Brazilian Indians and Japanese immigrants were of the same biological stock, and thus that assimilation was assured, found support among some Brazilian elites" (*Immigration* 161). As I have explained in another work, the Japanese in Peru have made similar attempts to link their nation's history, culture, and ethnic origins to those of indigenous Peruvian populations.

Although the forms I have chosen are neither the only ones nor the most commonly used, I have chosen to focus, for the most part, on literature (including nonfiction, such as memoirs, essays, and testimonials), art cinema, and documentary films because, in my view, they develop and reveal complex postwar Nikkei identitarian issues, articulate a collective Japanese Brazilian discourse, and provide a voice for this historically silenced group in a deeper way than other, perhaps more commercial, media, modes of expression and social discourse, such as radio, television, and journalism. Most texts and films under consideration share authorship by persons of Japanese descent (Japanese born or descendant), regardless of their level of affiliation with Brazil, Japan, or both countries. Yet the topics they address are quite diverse. For instance, while chapter 2 grapples with regional identities (Okinawan vs. Naichijin or mainland Japanese), and class and economic inequities, as well as racialism within and without the Nikkei community, chapter 3 focuses on issues such as gender, sexuality, patriarchy, generational gaps, and class. Numerous Japanese Brazilian narratives also provide intercultural translations to explain ethnic particularity and difference to the reading or viewing public. But they also include intercultural mistranslations, in which strategic self-orientalization gives a more extreme meaning to the word "imagined" in Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined community.

Some works, such as the first *Gaijin* film and Júlio Miyazawa's *Yawara! A Travessia Nihondin-Brasil* (*Yawara! Crossing Nihondin-Brazil*, 2006), attempt to rescue from oblivion the harsh history of indentured servitude and oppression endured by many Issei pioneers; others, such as Katsuzō Yamamoto's essay collection *Toda uma Vida no Brasil*, function as a celebration of the economic, sociopolitical, and cultural achievements of this ethnic group,

including their contributions to the betterment of Brazil. The works' economic success, in particular, is often included in Japanese Brazilian cultural production to claim its place within the Brazilian nation. Yamamoto's essays memorialize, for example, how Japanese immigrants changed the Brazilian diet by introducing new products (tea, acerola, *cupuassu* [tropical rainforest tree related to cacao], clove, kiwi, lychee, and Jamaica pepper, among others) and acclimatizing others, such as fruits (avocado, pineapple, plum, guava, papaya), vegetables (lettuce, garlic, potato, eggplant, artichoke, tomato, ginger, bamboo), flowers (chrysanthemum, orchid, azalea, camellia), and cereals (soy, rice, coffee). Yamamoto expresses his pride for having brought to his cooperative a technician from Japan who taught him how to prepare tea for export, before beginning his exports to Argentina, Chile, Holland, Germany, and the United States: "It is still bringing foreign currency to the country today. To this day, I feel proud to have initiated the negotiations for the export of Brazilian black tea."¹² His essays also celebrate the Nikkeijin's introduction of silk production and their contribution to the Brazilian ecology with their agricultural development of the Amazonian basin (they harvested rice, jute, and lea) and the Cerrado, the tropical savanna ecoregion in the states of Goiás and Minas Gerais: "The 1970s were the golden era of the famous Cotia Agricultural Cooperative, which no longer exists. Its director was Mr. Hifumi Ogasawara, a visionary who always explained to young farmers that the future of Brazilian agriculture was in the Cerrado."¹³

While much of this cultural production is significantly tied to the Nikkei experience in Brazil, it does not mean that Japanese Brazilian authors address no other issues. Many authors (Nisei poet Teruko Oda; the novelist Akira Nishimura, author of the English-language collection of homoerotic short stories *The Apprentice* [2009]; filmmaker Tizuka Yamasaki) have also directed films or written narratives and poetry dealing with topics unrelated to their ethnic background. In the case of Teruko Oda, for example, she uses the haikai format, albeit deviating from the most common Japanese tradition by including the poetic voice's ego in the representation of reality, as well as by using similes and Brazilian *kigos*. Yet topics such as (an often personified) Brazilian nature, death, loneliness, *saudade* (longing, nostalgia, homesickness), the transience of time, urban poverty, or destitute childhood are much more prevalent in her opus than Brazilian Nikkei history.¹⁴ In turn, Nishimura's *The Apprentice* significantly expands the spectrum of Nikkei

literature's themes by focusing on love, homoerotic desire, rape, incestuous and slave fantasies, intergenerational exploitative sex, and fetish, sometimes bordering on pornography.

Among the most recurring tropes and historic milestones addressed in Japanese Brazilian cultural production are the inception of the immigration process, *mestiçagem* (miscegenation), cultural integration, citizenship, oppression, forced relocation during World War II, Shindō Renmei's (Subject Path League) terrorism, and the dekasegi phenomenon. Through the re-creation of these transcendental episodes, Japanese Brazilian works delineate their own cultural history and epistemology. Other works, such as the two *Gaijin* films and Nakasato's novel *Nihonjin*, focus on Nikkei women's struggle against patriarchy and other localized forms of resistance, such as the key role of Nikkei women in the sociopolitical and economic success of their social group.

CULTURAL POLITICS OF INCLUSION AND DIFFERENCE

Portuguese legal scholar and sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos claims that without non-Western-centric global cognitive justice, there can be no global social justice. In his own words, "The epistemological privilege that modern science grants to itself is thus the result of the destruction of all alternate knowledges that could eventually question such privilege. It is, in other words, a product of what I called in a previous chapter *epistemicide*. The destruction of knowledge is not an epistemological artifact without consequences. It involves the destruction of the social practices and the disqualification of the social agents that operate according to such knowledges" (424). Japanese Brazilian discourse contributes to this denunciation of the "cognitive injustice" that fails to acknowledge the value of Global South, non-Western ways of knowing and being in the world. There is, as Santos points out, invaluable wisdom in the epistemological diversity of these worldwide ways of understanding the world, which have been silenced by Western colonization and domination.

As previously stated, the works under consideration are analyzed as tools for both epistemic decolonization and the sociopolitical empowerment of the Nikkeijin, as they are part of a twofold strategic, rhetorical engineering: the affirmation of ethnocultural difference, on the one hand, and the collective

assertion of citizenship and belonging to the Brazilian nation, on the other. In this book, I use the concept of “epistemicide” (coined by Santos) to refer to the governmental attempt to impose a Western value system, Brazilian culture, and Portuguese language on the Nikkeijin, while concomitantly trying to destroy Japanese language and culture in Brazil, through the prohibition of teaching the language in schools, possessing Japanese-language publications, or even speaking it in public. “Western civilization’s” philosophical, moral, economic, and intellectual systems were, therefore, considered universal, delegating minority cultures, considered inferior, to the background.

By highlighting identitarian heterogeneity, Japanese Brazilian cultural production prevents (self-)essentialization or the temptation to homogenize Japanese Brazilian consciousness or experiences. From a chronological perspective, these works trace the evolution of Nikkei discursive formations regarding their social and national consciousness, often showing a wide scope of identitarian options. These can range from the inception of the immigration process, often characterized by a sojourner mentality, loyalty to the Japanese Empire and Japanese-language writing, to the present state of cultural integration in which, among other options, many identify as Japanese Brazilian or unhyphenated Brazilian, and write almost exclusively in Portuguese. Many among the younger generations are characterized by a progressive loss of ethnic affiliation.

Members of the world’s largest Nikkei community since the 1950s (Manchuria’s Nikkei population was larger until that decade), the authors and filmmakers considered in this book are relatively new, peripheral voices that are asking to be heard. In fact, if Brazil, as a country of the Global South in the modern world-system, is located in the “periphery” of metropolitan centers, this group of minority writers and filmmakers resides in the outskirts of the national project or, rather, in an interstitial space between nations (Brazil and Japan). Their narratives, I believe, typify the Nikkei experience in Brazil as well as that of Brazilian dekasegi in Japan. Through its cultural production, this population, which has been subjected to two different diasporas, defies the limits of states and national boundaries, as well as those of Brazilian literary and filmic canons. As will be demonstrated here, these works reflect a lived experience that has drawn new, transnational, and unstable maps beyond the Brazilian and Japanese national borders, while concomitantly building symbolic bridges between the two countries, as well as a third space

of liminality and hybridization. Homi Bhabha maintains that the intervention of the third space of enunciation, a contradictory and ambivalent space located in the interstices of two or more cultures, “challenges our sense of the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People” (37). From this liminal space that problematizes the fictional purity and fixity of a Brazilian or Japanese national culture, Nikkei discourse enunciates its claim of cultural difference—in itself different from a received Japanese tradition—as a tool or site of resistance, empowerment, and production of a diasporic minority identities.

Concomitantly with this third-space positioning mentioned by Bhabha, however, these filmic and literary works also attempt to inscribe themselves within Brazilian national culture. Japanese Brazilian production of knowledge is therefore entangled with a will to power and their acceptance within mainstream society. It offers an impressive output of works produced since the 1980s that forms the richest and most variegated cultural production by writers of Asian descent in Latin America and the Caribbean. As the works under study reflect, the Brazilianization of the Nikkei minority was spurred not only by President Getúlio Vargas’s compulsory assimilation campaign in Brazil, but also by the traumatic episodes of World War II and the postwar period, including the Nikkeijin’s impossibility to return to Japan not only because of economic difficulties, but also because that country had been destroyed by war and, as a consequence, lost its empire. And, of course, the Brazilianization process was also accelerated by the inevitable, organic integration of newer generations into mainstream culture.

Nikkei cultural forms draw attention to transformative landmark events, such as the outbreak of World War II, which accelerated the progressive integration of the Nikkeijin into Brazilian society (once a return to Japan became even more improbable), and the *dekasegi* phenomenon, which divided families and weakened the minority group with a second exodus of its youngest members. Elisa Sasaki has studied the transcendent effect of World War II on Japanese Brazilians:

Until the emergence of World War II, Japanese immigrants in Brazil considered themselves *nihonjin*, that is, Japanese, since there was still hope to return to Japan after becoming wealthy. After this event, they moved on to build

their lives in Brazilian lands, away from the possibility of return. Until the war period, permanence in Brazil was seen as temporary. The war was used as a decisive factor in no longer having to resort to the rationale of the failure to return, which was the case of most immigrants. The definitive stay in Brazil, which had been taking place for at least a decade, is finally assumed and accepted. The war was the symbolic excuse to legitimize the process, which was inexorable, of the definitive permanence in Brazil.¹⁵

The issue of national identification among Brazilian Nikkeijin during the pre-World War II period, however, is quite complex and it would be simplistic to assume that before the war they all identified as Japanese and then they suddenly became Brazilians after the war. In any case, the end of the war was indeed a point of inflection that brought about a shift in self-identification and national affiliation among many of them, who became naturalized Brazilian citizens. Moreover, their offspring tended to call themselves Brazilians of Japanese ancestry during the postwar period. As a result, in spite of their determined resistance against President Vargas's assimilationist measures directed against Japanese-language publications and schools, which were implemented in the late 1930s, many Japanese Brazilians turned to the Portuguese language in most of their literary production and films, even though some authors continued to write haiku and tanka, and Japanese was still widely spoken. On the other hand, other early Portuguese-language writings by young Japanese Brazilians responded instead to the integration process that was already organically under way before the imposition of Vargas's restrictions. One must also keep in mind that national identity was not determined solely by Portuguese-language competence and that Japanese immigrants and their Brazilian-born children had already begun to write in Portuguese before the war, albeit mostly in the late 1930s and 1940s.

With time, many of the former loyal subjects of Japan and its emperor began to identify themselves as proud Brazilians, learned Portuguese, and became Catholics.¹⁶ The cultural production under study is precisely part of this continued collective effort to claim belonging within the Brazilian national project and the right to full citizenship in the Brazilian imaginary. That most of these works were written or filmed in Portuguese, even those that were produced at a time when the Japanese language was still widely used by Japanese Brazilians, attests to this Brazilianization effort.¹⁷ As several

texts published by dekasegi illustrate, this process of delinking with Japan and identifying with Brazil is far from over, as many dekasegi in Japan realize their own foreignness in their ancestral land and begin to identify with their native Brazil more strongly than before their departure. It remains to be seen, however, whether this new reterritorialization will one day lead Japanese Brazilians to change national allegiances again, this time to Japan. Another major factor of this transformation is the temporal distance from the arrival of the first wave of Issei laborers to the return of their descendants to Japan. The pioneers worked under conditions similar to those of indentured servants and migrated in family units—Brazilian authorities believed that these units would facilitate their permanent stay and offset their presumed incapacity to adapt to the local society and culture. The dilution of Nikkei ethnic identities among ensuing generations (Sansei, Yonsei, and Gosei) brought about a progressive loss of interest in Japanese language and culture. They also began to lose Japanese physical traits after intermarriage became more socially acceptable within their ethnic group.

Later immigration waves did not have to endure the hardships suffered by the first Issei. Some worked under improved conditions in Japanese-run *colônias* (communities of foreigners) built on land purchased by the Japanese government. Benefitting from the sacrifice of the Issei pioneers, many immigrants achieved economic independence in a much shorter time by purchasing their own land or by becoming independent entrepreneurs in the laundry, barber, or retailing guilds sectors, available, among others, to the Japanese of the time. After its discontinuance during the Second World War, Japanese immigration resumed from 1953 through 1973 with the arrival of 53,000 so-called Japão Novo (New Japan) immigrants, “educated youngsters, specialists qualified in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Subsequently, there was a migration of Japanese brides to marry these youngsters, who settled in Brazilian lands.”¹⁸ They took over agricultural areas abandoned by the Nikkeijin after their move to urban areas, bringing skilled labor and valuable technological knowledge to the Nikkei community and to the rest of Brazil. The Nikkeijin Tsugio Shindo (1930–), in his blend of historical study and memoir, *Passos da Imigração Japonesa no Brasil* (Steps of Japanese Immigration to Brazil, 2006), also emphasizes the fact that these new Nikkei immigrants, many of who found work in the Cotia Agricultural Cooperative, inaugurated in 1927, were mostly “highly educated single youngsters.”¹⁹

Through its discursive production, the Nikkei claim belonging to the Brazilian national project and a place in the mythical “racial democracy,”²⁰ thus quietly contesting another myth, that of Brazil’s three founding races (indigenous, black, and white) as well as that of idealized histories about the birth and development of the Brazilian nation.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

After African slavery was abolished in Brazil in 1888 mostly because of British pressure, Brazilian planters failed in their attempts to attract European fieldworkers, as they refused to work for low salaries and under harsh conditions reminiscent of those endured by slaves. In 1902, after listening to migrant workers’ complaints, the Italian government prohibited subsidized immigration to Brazil (The French and Spanish governments followed this decision.) Since coffee, a labor-intensive crop, continued to be Brazil’s main export, the next source of cheap labor considered by planters was Japan, whose government, since the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868) and the beginning of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, was trying to rid itself of its surplus of impoverished farmers. As Jhony Arai and Cesar Hirasaki explain, the visionaries of the Meiji government believed that emigration “would be one of the salvations to contain poverty and overpopulation in the country.”²¹ Indeed, because unemployment in Japan’s rural areas and the high taxes imposed by the Meiji government had left a large part of the rural population landless, the government saw in emigration a way to alleviate the social tension. The Japanese government also expected emigration to open new markets for Japanese products in Brazil and the rest of Latin America, to create Japanese ethnic communities abroad that could export food to Japan, and to improve the Japanese economy with the remittances of Japanese emigrants. Likewise, according to Ondina Antonio Rodrigues, the Brazilian government and plantation owners (*fazendeiros*) were hoping to open new markets in Japan: “to develop commercial relations between the two countries, the conquest of a new market, for our main export product, coffee” (9).

In 1868, the first few hundred Japanese emigrants left the country for Hawaii, Guam, and California, where they earned much more than in Japan but had to work under dreadful conditions. Through the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, however, the United States agreed not to restrict Japanese immigration

as long as Japan would not allow further emigration to the United States. Eventually, the Immigration Act of 1924 officially ended Japanese immigration. Since Hawaii (it did not become a US state until 1959) and Canada also passed laws restricting Japanese immigration, South America, and in particular Peru and Brazil, became the Meiji government's alternatives. A year after Brazil and Japan signed a treaty to allow Japanese migration to Brazil, the 1908 arrival of the first 781 Japanese immigrants to the port of Santos, near São Paulo (nine years after massive Japanese immigration began to arrive in Peru), marked the inception of the Japanese migration of *colonos* (foreign contract labor).²² According to Koji Sasaki, between 1899 and 1941, 188,209 Japanese emigrated to Brazil (by comparison, 87,848 emigrated to the United States) (qtd. in Lesser, *Immigration* 151). Because in Japan only first-born children inherited property, most of these immigrants who arrived in Brazil were landless second- or third-born offspring. According to Lesser, in the mid-1920s there was a dramatic increase in Japanese immigration, due to Brazil's interest in the booming Japanese economy and the United States anti-Asian immigration policies: "Japanese made up 2.3 percent of all immigrants to São Paulo in 1923, 4.0 in 1924, 8.7 in 1925, and 11.6 in 1928" (159). In 1934, however, a new clause in the Brazilian constitution imposed quotas for immigration: "an annual quota was fixed at two percent of the number of immigrants from each nation who had arrived in the previous fifty years, giving farmers preferential treatment . . . The official Japanese immigration quota for 1935 was under 3,000, a marked drop from the 23,000 who had entered in 1933" (164). These new laws were often ignored; Lesser explains that 10,000 Japanese immigrated that year and 50,000 in 1934, more than double that allowed by the quota (165). These racially motivated immigration quotas, Lesser adds, prove that the "claims of being a 'racial democracy' were not sustained in the area of immigration" (180).

Since few of these first immigrants were experienced farmers, they had difficulties adjusting to the harsh working conditions of São Paulo's plantations, whose owners, twenty years after the 1888 official emancipation, still had a difficult time abandoning habits acquired during centuries of slave labor. As the Issei painter, journalist, author, and historian Tomoo Handa (1906–96) observes in his *Memórias de um Imigrante Japonês no Brasil* (Memoirs of a Japanese Immigrant in Brazil, 1980), "one must remember that twenty years earlier slave labor was used here. The mentality according to which the worker was only a lesser man does not disappear in just twenty years."²³

Lesser likewise argues that landowners “often acted as if abolition had never taken place” (*Immigration* 157).

Japanese Brazilian literature and film often take notice of this persistent enslaver mentality. It is important to keep in mind that slavery existed in Brazil well before the beginning of the Portuguese conquest in 1532, as indigenous tribes would enslave one another, and that Brazil was the last Western country to abolish slavery—approximately 4.5 million African slaves, 40 percent of the African slaves brought to the Americas, were imported between 1501 and 1856. Centuries of enslavement of indigenous people, captured mostly by *bandeirantes* from São Paulo (their enslavement continued until the eighteenth century), and of those of African descent had left an indelible mark in the mindset of both large and small landowners that created a desire for cheap labor.²⁴ Interestingly, even though they authorized emigration to Brazil, Japanese officials must have been aware of the appalling conditions that awaited their countrymen: “before 1905, Japanese diplomats, operating from their Brazilian legation established in 1897, advised against Japanese immigration, based on their perception of poor treatment of Italian immigrant labor in São Paulo State” (Masterson and Funada-Classen 43).

The first immigrants’ ship, the *Kasato Maru*, departed from the port of Kobe and rounded South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Between 1917 and 1940, more than 164,000 Japanese immigrants moved to Brazil; by the 1930s, this country had the second-largest community of overseas Japanese in the world. This population became a serious concern for the Brazilian government, which, considering the Japanese inassimilable, introduced immigration quotas in 1935. Eleven years later, only a single vote in the Constituent Assembly prevented the prohibition of Japanese immigration from being included in the Brazilian Constitution. Although Japanese immigration to the Americas began with the Enomoto Colony in Chiapas, Mexico, in 1897 (García 154), Brazil continues to have the largest Nikkei community in the world, with 1,288,000 members in 1988 and between 1.2 and 1.4 million members today (mostly concentrated in the states of São Paulo and Paraná), despite the “return” of a large number of them to Japan in the late 1980s to work as *dekasegi* in Japanese factories. According to Lesser, Brazil’s 2010 census confirms that “the total number of self-declared ‘yellow’ respondents, more than two million, represents more than one percent of the total Brazilian population” (*Immigration* 186).²⁵

Disappointed with the living and working conditions in coffee plantations, mostly in the state of São Paulo, some Japanese pioneers soon began to leave them, sometimes escaping at night. But unlike the Japanese in Peru, who soon fled to the cities, in Brazil they stayed in rural areas for decades. Eventually, they were able to own farms and plantations; they even built their own immigrant communities (*núcleos colônias*), which became a source of pride for them. Yet, these settlements also fomented a sojourner mentality, as there was little interaction with majority Brazilians. In contrast with the Japanese experience in Peru, in order to build these agricultural colonies, Japanese immigrants often received the support of the Japanese government through immigration corporations such as the Kaigai Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK; Overseas Development Company). In Mexico, there was only one of these agricultural colonies, the Enomoto Colony (the first official Japanese “colony” established in the Americas), a “quasi-government-sponsored attempt to settle Japanese emigrants” (García 23). In Masterson and Sayaka Funada-Classen words, “the era of Brazil’s 35,000 pioneers (1908–25) was characterized by the successful transition of most Issei from the status of *colono* wage laborers on one of the huge coffee plantations to that of *sitiantes*, or small farm owners” (75). This transition, he adds, took between two and five years during which time the Issei worked as sharecroppers or lease farmers:

One example saw former Issei colonists settle on virgin land owned by a planter to plant coffee trees and their own cash crops without paying rent. They would then harvest the first coffee crop after five years, which they were permitted to keep and sell. The land would then be turned over to the plantation owner with its producing coffee trees. Sometimes the Issei would strike a similar deal with another Japanese immigrant family. Because their small savings often were exhausted with the initial land purchase, they would return to colonist wage labor to earn additional savings for their return to colonist wage holding in four to five more years. (Masterson and Funada-Classen 77)

However, *colonos* also suffered setbacks in their *núcleos*. As Thomas H. Holloway explains, “All the colonies established in western São Paulo from 1897 to 1911 were in marginal lands that the previous owners were anxious to sell to the state, and most were in areas where coffee did not do well or where the coffee cycle was past its peak. A worker who bought a plot took

on a five- to ten-year debt with uncertain return. The low purchase price and easy time payments may have looked like a bargain to some, but there were risks and limitations involved in nucleo farming that the plantation colono did not have" (138). At any rate, even though Japanese colonists were often praised for their impressive diligence, their desire to become independent farmers soon gained them a reputation for being an unreliable longtime labor source, an outcome that infuriated some Brazilian legislators.

Nikkei works often echo the first immigrants' dream of attaining wealth by working in coffee plantations for a few years before returning to Japan, even though saving money was difficult. Besides receiving very low salaries, Japanese immigrants were forced to purchase their living needs at high prices in the plantation store. The examined works also reflect their shock upon encountering such a different culture, one with strange customs, religion, dietary habits, and language. Because they considered themselves sojourners until the end of World War II, few Japanese immigrants bothered to adapt to Brazilian culture or to learn the Portuguese language; they instead grouped together, living in relative isolation from mainstream culture and practicing endogamy within their ethnic group. Besides creating suspicion among Brazilians, the isolation in which they lived would bring tragic consequences during World War II, after President Vargas's nationalist *Estado Novo* dictatorship (New State, 1937–1945; following a period of indecision about what powers Brazil should support in World War II) implemented a homogenizing "Brazilianization" campaign that repressed German, Italian, and Japanese communities by forbidding them to speak their native languages publicly or to teach them to their children.²⁶ Since many Issei did not know Portuguese, once their Japanese-language radio stations and newspapers (nearly 90 percent of the Japanese could read) were outlawed, they became misinformed about the war's developments. Masuda Goga adds that the closing of Japanese-language newspapers "marked the beginning of the 'cultural crisis' in the community."²⁷ Indeed, it had traumatic effects, since, as María Zelideth Rivas points out, "The presence of Japanese-language print media in Brazil created an in-between cultural space that aimed to capture Japanese Brazilian identities and culture, emphasizing a linguistically linked people. Here, the immigrants and their descendants could explore new aspects of their lives in Brazil, constantly turning to articles that emphasized life in Brazil while also staying abreast of news in Japan" ("Songs" 792). Anti-Japanese hysteria

would reach its apex after Brazil joined the Allies in 1942. This population withstood the hostile environment, which included surveillance; movement restrictions; property confiscation; relocation; imprisonment; and the closing of Japanese schools, associations, and newspapers.

As reflected in Japanese Brazilian works, Issei immigrants and their descendants reacted differently to these adverse circumstances by resorting to mimicry and emulation, organizing themselves in associations and clubs, isolating themselves from majority Brazilians, founding Japanese schools and keeping them clandestine after they were outlawed, and even forming a powerful, ultranationalist terrorist group. Lesser has summarized some of these resistance techniques: “Fazendeiros hoping for docile colonists found that poor treatment was no more acceptable to Japanese workers than to others. Newcomers who thought they would become rich felt tricked, and some remigrated to Argentina where salaries were higher. Some fled from plantations to urban areas in the states of Minas Gerais, Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. Others moved into railroad construction, and Campo Grande, a large city near the Bolivian border, is still renowned for the size of its Okinawan-descended population” (*Immigration* 155).

After Brazil joined the Allies and declared war on Japan in August 1942, numerous Japanese families were removed from the coast (mostly from Santos) for fear that they could be providing intelligence assistance to the Axis Powers. This sad episode is re-created, for example, in Maria Cecília Missako Ikeoka’s (1941–) *Banzai Brasil! Banzai Japão!: Histórias de Seis Gerações* (*Banzai Brazil! Banzai Japan!: Stories of Six Generations*, 2008). The author’s family—along with those of other Japanese, Germans and Italians—was given twenty-four hours to prepare and was then resettled by the army on 8 July 1931, in compliance with President Vargas’s orders: “that way, suffering mistreatment, my parents, along with all the Japanese who lived on the coast of São Paulo, were forced to abandon their homes. The army trucks left us at the train station, in downtown Santos; soon, the Japanese left for the Hospedaria dos Imigrantes [immigrant inspection station], in São Paulo, where they stayed some days.”²⁸ This type of denunciation of past abuses is common in Nikkei cultural production. The Japanese were also banned from participating in political activities or holding meetings, and were ordered to carry a safe-conduct pass issued by the police to travel within the country. Japanese companies’ goods were confiscated. People and mail from Japan

were prohibited from arriving in Brazil and, since radio sets were forbidden, Japanese immigrants no longer listened to war news through short wave transmissions coming from Japan. Even when they were able, they were misinformed, because the Japanese government often manipulated information to avoid revealing that they were losing the war.

Two key episodes in the history of the Nikkeijin in Brazil are often reenacted in Japanese Brazilian literature and film. The first one is the appearance, in the state of São Paulo during the 1940s, of the first modern terrorist group in the Americas: the Japanese organization Shindō Renmei, founded in 1942, which will be discussed at length in chapter 4. The second key episode is the dekasegi phenomenon (discussed in chapters 5 and 6) of the late 1980s, the “reverse” migration of the Nikkeijin to Japan. The late 1980s saw the beginning of the “return” migration of 250,000 Brazilian Nikkeijin, who fled economic recession by moving to Japan to work as dekasegi. Masterson and Funada-Classen assert that the weakness of the Brazilian economy and the lack of attractive jobs for university-educated Nikkeijin explain “their willingness to seek opportunities in Japan, where they were less fettered with family obligations or careers of long standing. Additionally, these young Brazilian Nikkei-jin were more able to do the hard and dirty factory work required of them in Japan” (247).

As some works considered in this book point out, newer generations of Nikkeijin are fully adapted to mainstream Brazilian culture and increasingly less involved in Nikkei associations or issues related to the Nikkei community. Along with the dekasegi phenomenon, the aging population, and a low birth rate, the popularity of intermarriage with other ethnic groups is progressively decreasing the Japanese Brazilian population and the importance their members give to ethnic identities. Yet today, Nikkeijin continue to enjoy social prestige in Brazil thanks to their socioeconomic success as well as Japan’s postwar economic miracle, which turned the country into the second-largest economy in the world until it was recently surpassed by China. The last two chapters of this book study the reasons why this social prestige has not followed Brazilian dekasegi to Japan.

(INTERNAL) COLONIAL DIFFERENCE AND ATTEMPTED EPISTEMICIDE

It is no secret that the Brazilian government and planters preferred European agricultural workers, as they equated “whitening” the Brazilian

population with bringing the country closer to Western modernity; yet European immigrants refused to work under the exploitative conditions offered to them years before. In this context, the global theater and the geopolitics surrounding it complicate the usual dichotomy between Western / white / European / more technologically advanced colonizer and non-Western / nonwhite / non-European / underdeveloped colonized. Even though Brazilian coffee plantation owners saw themselves as white, hence “superior,” the Japanese, during the first massive migrations, came from a more developed country. The Japanese Brazilian experience, in this regard, tests and questions the center-periphery model of both postcolonial studies and the decolonial project. Lesser reveals that through Japanese diplomats’ efforts, “Japanese immigrants were presented as everything the Europeans were not: quiet, hardworking, and eager to become Brazilian” (Lesser, *Immigration* 152) and that “Japanese immigrants were well received by many in the Brazilian elite who accepted the Japanese government’s claim that its people were the ‘whites of Asia’” (*Discontented* 5). This presumed mark of whiteness of the Japanese, together with their recent military victory over a European power, the Russian Empire, clashed with the racialism of the “Yellow Peril” negative markers associated with Chinese immigrants.²⁹ These contradictions were the source of fascinating negotiations and dilemmas, some of which are reflected in this corpus of works. Following a hemispheric trend, both contrasting stereotypes eventually morphed into a different one, known in the United States as the “model minority.” The myth of the lazy native, so common in the colonial world, rarely affected Asian populations in the Americas.

Furthermore, whereas innocent Japanese immigrants suffered internal colonialism in Brazil, their country of origin had recently begun its imperial expansion in East Asia, when, in 1869, the new Meiji government renamed Ezo or Ezochi (as the island was formerly known to the Japanese, among other names) as Hokkaido and annexed it into the emerging Japanese nation-state. Then, it formally annexed the Ryukyu Islands and turned the kingdom into the new Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. Soon thereafter, Meiji Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) over the Qing dynasty in China, a victory that opened the door to the eventual control of the Korean Peninsula (Korea would be formally annexed in 1910), and gained two new colonial possessions for Japan, the Liaodong Peninsula and the island of Taiwan. Japan’s

policy of aggressive territorial expansion was thus well underway when the first Issei immigrants landed at the port of Santos. This historical perspective further complicates the dichotomy of colonizer versus colonized, particularly when considering that some Japanese immigrants brought along the jingoistic ultranationalism, the imperialistic spirit, and the sense of ethnic/racial superiority taught in Japan since the 1868 Meiji Restoration. Moreover, the fact that modern Brazilian society was in itself the outcome of Portuguese imperialism and colonialism further complicates these social dynamics.

Japanese immigrants and their descendants were demonized as potential saboteurs, spies, and soldiers in disguise during the anti-Japanese hysteria of World War II, which the US government encouraged throughout Latin America. They became victims of geopolitics and an internal colonialism that became intensified by a culture of fear in Brazil.³⁰ In this study, I analyze, for the most part, Nikkei cultural production in light of this ethnic group's subtle attempt at internal cultural decolonization and at reversing the epistemicidal measures taken by Vargas's Estado Novo, the first case of classic Latin American populism.³¹ Through its writers and filmmakers, this social group pushes back at the homogenizing official discourse of Brazilian nationalism during those years. Instead of following the typical colonial process that W.E.B. Du Bois called "double consciousness," the oppressed Nikkei minority that appears in these works complicates the concept: rather than seeing themselves through the eyes of the Other as ontologically inferior or as foreigners in their own country, Nikkeijin rarely relinquished their own sense of ethnic superiority, as evidenced still today by the recurrent declarations of pride in Japanese Brazilian scholarly and socioeconomic achievements in Ryoki Inoue's novel *Saga: A História de Quatro Gerações de uma Família Japonesa no Brasil* (*Saga: The History of Four Generations of a Japanese Family in Brazil*, 2006) and many other Nikkei works. In short, just as some Brazilian plantation owners viewed Japanese immigrants as inferior to them, so did the Issei see themselves at times as ethnically superior to the members of the host society, thus participating in a process of self-essentialization. Interestingly, Ernani Oda argues that the notion of a purported common cultural base for the Japanese nation is quite recent, beginning with the Meiji Restoration. He problematizes this celebratory discourse of Japanese educational virtues and work ethics by tying it to a history of imperialism and brutal colonialism:

Let us not forget that the celebrated work and educational ethics are much less a tradition from immemorial times than a political program devoted to the introduction of the capitalist system and state centralization during the second half of the nineteenth-century (Mita 1992, 224–247). Moreover, these ethics were an instrument of domination in the colonization of the regions of Okinawa, Hokkaido, Korea, and Taiwan, where native people were forced to work in order to supply the Japanese market, and to study in Japanese schools to forget their “barbarian” customs, and to become deserving subjects of the “Great Japanese Empire.” (104)³²

According to Oda, this acritical and apologetic view of Japanese culture in Brazil facilitates its interpretation as a “homogeneous, immutable, and exotic totality.”³³

The Brazilian government resorted, particularly during World War II and its aftermath, to different technologies of power in order to control the Japanese. This subjugation even reached the level of language, as they were forbidden to speak Japanese in public or to teach it in schools, to own Japanese-language books, or to have a Japanese-language press. This episode is central in Lúcia Hiratsuka’s novel *Os Livros de Sayuri* (Sayuri’s Books, 2008), where the young protagonist’s family has to bury their Japanese-language books because they have just been forbidden by the Brazilian government, along with all Japanese schools: “and the box was buried. As if the books were dead. Or as if they were treasures?”³⁴ Because they looked like the enemy, the Nikkeijin were dehumanized and racially profiled as an “enemy within” who was ready to support a Japanese invasion, especially after Brazil declared war on the Axis Powers. This perception has not completely disappeared, as Lesser points out that “many people in Brazil erroneously assume that Nikkeijin feel ‘Japanese’ and thus have an emotional attachment to Japan as an irrefutable homeland” (*Discontented* xxi). In any case, the potential consequences of Brazil’s direct participation in the war inevitably created anxiety and apprehension among the Nikkeijin.

While Japanese identities became disqualified and the Nikkeijin were forced to relocate inland from strategic Atlantic coastal areas, the United States did not pressure the Brazilian government to send its Japanese population to internment camps in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Crystal City and Kenedy, in southern Texas, as was done with Peru and sixteen other Latin American countries, mainly because Brazil has no Pacific coastline. Whereas the

Mexican government sent most of its Japanese and Japanese Mexican population to the Hacienda de Temixco internment camp near Cuernavaca, only a very small fraction of the large Japanese community in Brazil was sent to an internment camp in the Japanese community of Acará (today's Tome-Açu) in the Amazonian area of Pará. The Brazilian government refused to create internment camps within its frontiers for the remaining Japanese nationals and their descendants perhaps because of the sheer size of the community (200,000) and the fact that most lived in relative isolation in rural areas of the states of São Paulo and Paraná. According to Lesser, it was the result of two different fears: "that the population was too large and well armed to intern or deport without creating a rebellion, and that Japan might attack (and defeat) Brazil if Japanese citizens were rounded up" (168). But the Vargas regime did try at all costs to prevent the Nikkeijin's affiliation with Japan and its emperor, Hirohito. The aggressive nationalism and prejudice of the Brazilian government, combined with the general population's economic resentment (felt toward Chinese and Japanese throughout the Americas), made the daily life of the Brazil's Nikkeijin difficult.

Although repression ended shortly after World War II, Nikkei writing and film suggest that this ethnic group has been plagued ever since by feelings that could be perceived as ambivalent: a contradictory desire to belong within the Brazilian nation while distinguishing themselves from majority Brazilians. As Lesser points out, "Nikkei subjects resented representations of diasporic ethnicity by majority society and rejected the idea that they were 'Japanese.' These same people, however, saw themselves as different from normative Brazilians, and their stereotypes of 'Brazil' and 'Brazilians' as 'other' were often as strong as the majority stereotypes of 'Japan' and 'Japanese'" (*Discontended* 151). On the other hand, one can also find the opposite phenomenon. As Cristina Rocha has revealed in her study of Zen Buddhism in Brazil, it was European orientalism, rather than the local Nikkeijin, that mediated the Brazilian intelligentsia's perception of Japan, Buddhism, and haiku: "Rather than viewing Japanese immigrant communities in Brazil as a source of the 'exotic East,' Brazilian artists and intellectuals—and eventually the general public—were inspired either indirectly by ideas of Orientalism originating from cultural centers in the West such as France, England, and the United States, or directly through assumptions about the 'authenticity' of Japan itself" (200). This suggests that majority Brazilians did not consider the

Nikkeijin's Japaneseness authentic enough to consider them a reliable source of information on Zen Buddhism. In Rocha's words, "While the Brazilian cultural elite were drawn toward fantasies of lost wisdom in ancient Japanese classical ages long past, they did not view Japanese immigrants in Brazil as legitimate carriers of this heritage" ("Zen in Brazil" 201).

From this perspective, can we talk about decoloniality when dealing with Asians in Latin America? How then do we contextualize the liminal nature of Japanese immigration in Brazil within the context of center/West versus periphery/non-Western countries? Japan's emulation of European colonialism and imperialism, together with its fledgling status as a world power with the strongest armed forces in Asia, complicated both Japanese self-perception in Brazil and majority Brazilians' view of them. I argue that, indeed, Japanese Brazilian cultural production can be conceived of as a veiled display of agency and as a collective counternarrative against this sentiment of internal colonialism. Some texts exhibit a therapeutic impetus to heal the colonial wound inflicted first by the Japanese government, which considered the future emigrants excess population, and then by Brazil, which exploited them as cheap labor. Such works enact a contestatory disposition by which their authors, becoming the voice of their ethnic group, talk back to the regional, sociocultural impositions of the nation-state, proposing instead a new, transnational geocultural space.

Just as Edward Said, in *Culture and Imperialism*, provides instances of European literature being used as a tool for justification of imperialism and colonialism, Japanese Brazilian cultural forms have also been used to empower the Nikkeijin, as a subversive resistance and decolonizing tactic against the techniques of power of two different states. Through their films, novels, short stories, poetry essays, and testimonials, ethnic Japanese in Brazil recall (or imagine) their own past and historicize it by bringing back repressed memories and silenced histories. But, emulating nationalist discourse, this act of remembering is sometimes followed by a collective, societal amnesia of certain historical episodes. By becoming culture producers, Japanese Brazilians combat the epistemic racism and the racialization of thought that have devalued or, even worse, ignored their worldviews and ways of being in the world. The goal is, therefore, not only to enter Brazilian national consciousness, but also to question a hitherto mostly Eurocentric and Western national culture that has often been considered "universal."

MODERNITY AND SPLIT TEMPORALITY

Works such as *Crônicas de um Garoto que Também Amava os Beatles e os Rolling Stones* (Chronicles of a Boy Who Also Loved the Beatles and the Rolling Stones, 1988) by the dekasegi Agenor Kakazu present both the Japanese in Japan and Japanese Brazilians (conceived of as a sort of outgrowth of the economically successful Japan) as models to be emulated by majority Brazilians. Kakazu proposes in his chronicles the need to Nipponize his native Brazil, not necessarily by letting Japanese Brazilians pave the way, as happened with President Alberto Fujimori in Peru, but rather by emulating Japan itself. He proposes a Japanese coworker, Shioya, as a model to follow for Brazilians, as he is willing to work relentlessly for the betterment of his country: “At the time, at age forty-nine, Mr. Shioya still looked like a strong and vigorous youngster, ready to work and to contribute to the growth and progress of his country. Undoubtedly, he was a remnant of those who helped elevate Japan to a world power level, with their daily contribution of sweat and blood. It was the millions of strong arms like his, of dedicated servers that rebuilt a nation reduced to ashes by two atomic bombs.”³⁵

Likewise, in a pedagogical tone, Silvio Sam’s *Sonhos Que De Cá Segui* (Dekasegi Dreams, 1997) and other texts approach the recollection of recent and past history as a patriotic knowledge-production exercise that should contribute to the eventual betterment of Brazilian society. These works engage in strategic cultural politics by openly encouraging readers to learn from Japanese or Nikkei behavior. In this context, Lesser argues that as Brazilian society essentialized the Nikkeijin, they also contributed to this notion by essentializing themselves, claiming that Brazil was a country in need of Nipponization. Japanese Brazilians supposedly embodied Japan’s hypermodernity: “the same people who believed Nikkei to be ethnically rigid and impenetrable (and thus not truly Brazilian) often took the position that the Brazilian nation would improve by becoming ‘more Japanese.’ Nikkei by and large accepted an identity where they were not Brazilians of the present but were Brazilians of the future” (Lesser; *Discontented* xxvi).

In the context of the internal colonialism suffered by Japanese Brazilians, this demeanor is diametrically opposed to the typical colonized mind. Thus, in the opening of *Peau noire, masques blancs* (*Black Skin, White Masks*, 1952), Frantz Fanon, within the framework of his psychiatric and psychological

analyses of the dehumanizing effects of colonization, suggests the existence of an inferiority complex among the colonized by stating that “the black man wants to be white” (9) and “for the black man there is only one destiny. And it is white” (10).³⁶ In contrast with Fanon’s devastating conclusions, part of the Japanese Brazilian discourse proposes a radically different solution: to have majority Brazilians emulate the Nikkeijin or Japanese work ethic, and to adopt their faster rhythm thereby overcoming the purported time lag between Brazil and Japan. No inferiority complex exists in this type of discourse. Incidentally, as I discussed elsewhere, former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori resorted to these same strategic modernizing and essentializing arguments in his 1990 presidential campaign; its motto was “work, honesty, and technology.”³⁷ In Brazil and Peru, therefore, Nikkei communities have strategically affiliated with the spectacular economic and technological achievements of post-World War II Japan, presenting themselves as a role model for society and as a more advanced population than the slightly “backwards” majority Brazilian and Peruvian societies.

Dipesh Chakrabarty, in his *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (2000), criticizes the Eurocentric model by which Europeans recommend that the colonized wait, constantly reminding them that they were “not yet” civilized enough to rule themselves and consigning them to an imaginary waiting room of history. In reaction to this stagist and historicist distinction between the modern and the nonmodern, during the nationalist struggles in India, the nationalist elite rejected “the ‘waiting-room’ version of history when faced with the Europeans’ use of it as a justification for denial of ‘self-government’ to the colonized” (9). European colonizers believed that the peripheral histories of others were mere variations of a master narrative on the history of Europe. Later, Japan would adopt this approach as a strategy for its own colonialist aspirations, an ethnocentric worldview that has perhaps partly survived in Brazil.

Paradoxically, the same Japanese Brazilians who subtly denied coevalness (to use Johannes Fabian’s phrase in his 1983 *Time and the Other*) or contemporaneity for majority Brazilians would later feel rejected as foreigners in Japan once the dekasegi remigration began. For this reason, the study of Brazil’s Nikkeijin and of their cultural production must be done in both spatial and temporal frames; while the spatial encompasses the two transoceanic diasporas, the temporal frame takes into account two different temporalities

by which Japan and, by extension, Japanese Brazilians are strategically represented as models to be imitated. Curiously, in light of this assessment, Japanese Brazilians, having suffered internal colonialism, unintentionally use the typically colonial discourse of the temporal modern/nonmodern split, perhaps as an atavistic leftover of the affective cartography of the Japanese Empire, by which the Meiji government redefined other East Asian countries as peripheral to Japan and degraded their citizens as barbarians in need of civilization: backward, inferior, and nonmodern colonized people are considered to be lagging and must “catch up” with modern colonizers. As discussed further on, some Nikkei texts offer cultural borrowing as a gift for Brazilian self-improvement.

As the term indicates, Japanese Brazilian cultural production is still Brazilian; therefore, its relation with the mainstream of Brazilian cultural production must be examined and a question must be posed: is Japanese Brazilian production unique in comparison with the literature and film of other Brazilian social groups (Afro-Brazilians are not a minority) or with mainstream Brazilian cultural production? In my essay “Exoticization, *Mestiçagem*, and Brazilian National Consciousness in Carlos Diegues’s *Quilombo*,” included in *Celluloid Chains*, I mention that two Brazilian historical films, Yamasaki’s *Gaijin: Os Caminhos da Liberdade* (*Gaijin, a Brazilian Odyssey*, 1980) and Carlos Diegues’s *Quilombo* (1984), examine Japanese indentured servitude and African and Afro-Brazilian resistance to slavery respectively. Notably, Nikkei cultural production is not unique in its attempt to recover a silenced history of unfreedom, racism, xenophobia, and internal colonialism by challenging official histories. Other ethnic groups, particularly those of non-European descent who share similar emancipating efforts, also use literature and film to rediscover their roots and to challenge the different types of marginalization endured through the collective voice of their respective communities. Brazil’s Nikkeijin are not unique in their effort to recover their social memory, to struggle against epistemicide and racialization, and to combat their exoticization through literature and film. Furthermore, postwar, Lusophone, Japanese Brazilian cultural production exhibits no particular formal differences from Brazilian cultural production, or from other diasporic, ethnic Brazilian literature and film. Haiku writing, for example, is not exclusive to Nikkei poets, as numerous non-Nikkei Brazilian haikin have excelled in this practice, as Masuda Goga discloses (34–35).³⁸ Two different cultural

trajectories intersected during the postwar period: the Japanese-language *haikai*³⁹ written by Japanese immigrants and the Portuguese-language ones written by mostly Euro-Brazilian writers influenced by Western Japonisme.

However, Nikkei works do privilege, as may be expected, Nikkei characters and topics, all the while echoing the Nikkeijin's evolving ideological and historical subtexts. Their uniqueness resides, therefore, in the narrative content rather than in the form: mainly (perhaps only) in their often ambiguous and ambivalent stance between a claim to full Brazilian citizenship and a contestatory affirmation of cultural difference. Whether insinuated or manifested, Nikkei cultural production's postulation of the Japanese people in Japan and, occasionally, of Japanese Brazilians as role models for Brazilian society, undoubtedly separates it from other Brazilian cultural production and probably also from that of most minority discourses, with the exception of other Japanese Latin American groups.

AN ARCHIVE OF EMOTIONS

These works recast the image of the Nikkeijin by providing a collective (albeit heterogeneous) self-definition of their ethnicity, along with a sense of belonging and citizenship that is often tied to historical and spatial contexts. Even a cursory look at texts such as Agenor Kakazu's *Crônicas de um Garoto que Também Amava os Beatles e os Rolling Stones* or Maria Cecília Missako Ikeoka's *Banzai Brasil! Banzai Japão!: Histórias de Seis Gerações* is enough to find the insistence on the Brazilian patriotism of the authors' families. In the second book, though the author's parents are proud to be Japanese, they constantly remind their children that they are Brazilian and should be proud of it. The parents even paint their house with the colors of the Brazilian flag: "The house was well kept and needed no repairs; still, it was painted all over in yellow, with the windows and doors in green."⁴⁰ Along these lines, when they find out in May 1943 that Brazil has joined the Allied forces in World War II, the Okinawan parents encourage their children to fight for Brazil if needed: "My children, this is a very difficult time. Brazil is at war with Japan. Blood unites us, but duty separates us. You are Brazilian citizens and must fight for Brazil if you are summoned to war.' Finally, he said to Kincas: 'serve your country with pride and courage'" (142–43).⁴¹ Each work, therefore, contributes to the creation of an affective cartography, an archive of feelings

that traces, throughout generations, the genealogy and transmission of private and public emotions. These feelings may be positive, such as pride and self-confidence, or negative, such as shame, bitterness, regret, failure, despair, resentment, *saudade*, alienation, self-hatred, loneliness, and melancholy in the pathological sense. Recurrent aestheticization of affective life and the inclusion of the same (or similar) forms of feeling from text to text reveal the collective, intersubjective, and public nature of these emotional experiences. More important, as the texts reexamine Nikkei history, is that these intersubjective emotions form an archive of feelings that is transmittable throughout generations.

It is also apparent, however, that these feelings do not remain the same; they evolve as time passes and as characters move from Japan to Brazil, from rural to urban areas, or from Brazil to Japan. Shame or national/ethnic pride may shift over time, progressively wane, or disappear altogether. Simultaneously, the changes in modalities of feeling and material practices, which are often-times deeply tied to epochal transformations and migrations, ultimately reveal the unstable or uncertain nature of Nikkei identities. These—which include emotions, feelings, and affect—are also historically constructed. Embedded in the formation of the modern Japanese and Brazilian nation-states, this cultural history of the transmission of Japaneseness, Nikkeiness, and *brasilidade* (Brazilianness) reveals the birth of a transnational third space that thrives in the interstices of both nations. From the periphery of the modern world-system, Nikkei cultural production echoes the historical transformation of pride, shame and other emotions, depending on spatial changes and temporal frames.

As new generations of Japanese Brazilians become more integrated into mainstream Brazilian or Japanese societies, these works re-create the changing collective structures of feeling. The sociality of emotions is often deeply tied to a material culture related, for example, to the cherry blossom; the kimono; the *ofuro* (a type of Japanese bathtub that originated as a short, steep-sided wooden bathtub); the *bento* box (single-portion takeout or home-packed meal); the *butsudan* (Buddhist altar); and the *shamisen*, the *taiko* drums, and other traditional musical instruments. These narratives' expression of affect is also tied to cultural practices, such as haiku writing, *hanami* (flower viewing), *ikebana* (the art of flower arrangement), food and drinks (sushi, miso soup, sake), *origami* (the folk art of folding paper into shapes), *sadō*

(traditional tea ceremony), and the *tanomoshi* (rotating credit association), along with sumo, kendo, and other sports and martial arts.⁴² At one point, this narrative display of quintessentially Japanese, Okinawan, or Nikkei objects, traditions and cultural practices becomes a sort of Japanese Brazilian version of the cabinet of curiosity, or Wunderkammer, in Renaissance Europe, in which each object or tradition contained its own nostalgic history of affective experience. In the long run, however, this open display of the tenuous temporality of yearning may sometimes walk a thin line between cultural pride and self-exoticism, as will be determined. One may also trace these affective cartographies as they travel “back” to Japan with the *dekasegi*. Once in Japan, the nostalgic cultural and material practices are curiously tied, not to the ancestral homeland, but to symbolic and quintessentially Brazilian artifacts and practices—dancing samba, playing soccer, eating *feijoada* (a stew made with beans, beef, and pork), the highly “nationalized” emotion of *saudade*, now resignified in a transnational context.

The works analyzed in this book evoke the affective dimensions elicited by these cultural practices and material culture. More important perhaps is that this examination fills the vacuum of the hitherto largely undernarrated Japanese Brazilian cultural history. In this process, it rewrites the ideas of Brazilianness and Japaneseness from both the margins of the nation-state and the interstices between states, while concomitantly exhibiting an epistemic disobedience toward the mandates of a Western modernity with pretensions of universality.

THE BOOK AND ITS ORGANIZATION

Rather than basing the arrangement of the chapters on the film debut or work publication dates, the chapters are chronologically organized according to which immigration phase is re-created in the work. Thus, the first three chapters include works that address the inception of the immigration process—such as the first *Gaijin* (1980), *Nihonjin* (2011), *Yawara!* (2006), and *Saga* (2006)—even if part of the plot also deals with later periods. In turn, the last three chapters focus, for the most part, on later periods, including World War II and its aftermath, and the second phase of the immigration process when it resumes with the arrival of the “Japão Novo” in 1953 (the two *Corações Sujos* [Dirty Hearts, the 2000 book and 2011 film], *O Súdito* [The

Subject, 2008], and *Os Livros de Sayuri* [2008]), as well as the dekasegi exodus (*Crônicas de um Garoto* [1988], *Sonhos que de Cá Segui* [1997], *Hyôryû-gai* [*The City of Lost Souls*; 2002], the second *Gaijin* [2005], and *Lonely Swallows* [2011]).

The first chapter studies cultural celebration, historical memory, and claiming place in Júlio Miyazawa's novels. It contextualizes the topic of resistance and the emergence of a Nikkei cultural discourse in *Yawara! A Travessia Nihondin-Brasil* with the treatment of those same issues in his second novel, *Uma Rosa para Yumi* (*A Rose for Yumi*), where the author studies the involvement of Nisei youth against the military dictatorship during the 1970s. The exploration of identitarian issues leads to the problematization of stable Nikkei identities, allowing them to emerge, with all their complexities, as fluid, hybrid, and changing subjectivities.

Chapter 2 explores racism, miscegenation, and ethnic celebration in Ryoki Inoue's novel *Saga*. The author addresses not only Nippophobia, but also the Japanese immigrants' racist and xenophobic feelings toward Okinawans, mixed-race Nikkeijin, and Brazilians. Other issues explored are the relation between tradition and prejudice, as well as transculturation and miscegenation. *Saga*'s celebration of Nikkei sociocultural and economic success becomes a tool for such cultural and identitarian negotiations, which ultimately provide a voice for this ethnic group's collective agency.

Chapter 3 analyzes female agency and the struggle against patriarchy in Oscar Nakasato's novel *Nihonjin*, Tizuka Yamasaki's film *Gaijin: Os Caminhos da Liberdade* (*Gaijin, a Brazilian Odyssey*, 1980), and Lúcia Hiratsuka's novel *Os Livros de Sayuri*. In *Nihonjin*, two female characters challenge the stereotype of the submissive and docile Nikkei wife or daughter. Their transgressions, while perceived by other characters as cultural and familial betrayal, do not make them negative characters; on the contrary, their agency turns them into brave women who manage to rid themselves of the oppressive ethnocultural structures that prevent them from feeling accomplished as human beings. Yamasaki's film explores the topics of marginalization, transculturation, and patriarchy during the first decades. In *Os Livros de Sayuri* female agency is represented by an innocent young girl's resistance to anti-Japanese hysteria through her determination to keep a Japanese-language book representing her culture.

Chapter 4 addresses the transformational impact of World War II on the Nikkeijin and the history of Shindô Renmei, as seen in Vicente Amorim's film *Corações Sujos*, Fernando Morais's essay of the same title, and Jorge Okubaro's

text *O Súdito* (*Banzai, Massateru!*). In turn, chapter 5 looks at the dekasegi phenomenon as it reflects the clash of two different modernities, the Brazilian and the Japanese ones, in Yamasaki's *Gaijin: Ama-me como Sou* (*Gaijin 2: Love Me As I Am*, 2005), Kakazu's chronicle collection *Crônicas de um Garoto*, and Sam's novel *Sonhos que de Cá Segui*. In the last two works, this collective self-representation of the dekasegi experience turns into the presentation of the Japanese or Brazilian Nikkeijin as role models for the wider Brazilian society. Complementing these Brazilian self-definitions in printed texts, the sixth chapter analyzes the Japanese documentaries *Lonely Swallows* and *A Grandpa from Brazil*, as well as the Japanese feature film *Hyôryû-gai* (*The City of Lost Souls*), as they explore the misfortunes of Brazilian Nikkeijin in Japan.

NOTES

1. Zelideth Rivas has studied "boutique multiculturalism" in Japan, which is characterized by its superficial relationship to other cultures' products, as well as by the use of mixed race people in the advertisements of luxury goods. In the case of the commodification of the band Linda Sansei's mixed race for Japanese fans, "as consumers of 'boutique multiculturalism,' they do not engage with or consider the economic conditions that brought the girls and their families to Japan as dekasegi. Instead, they leave the performances with more superficial knowledge about Brazil . . . 'Boutique multiculturalism,' therefore, allows fans to locate themselves as consumers of Brazil's surface culture through their consumption of Linda Sansei" (Rivas, "Mistura" 724). According to Rivas, this band markets, in a nonthreatening way, a reshaped Brazil (often associated with crime and poverty in Japanese media) for Japanese audiences.

2. The six studies are the following: Fredy González's *Paisanos Chinos: Transpacific Politics among Chinese Immigrants in Mexico* (2017), Robert Chao Romero's *The Chinese in Mexico 1882–1940* (2010), Grace Peña Delgado's *Making the Chinese Mexican: Global Migration, Localism, and Exclusions in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands* (2012), Julia María Schiavone Camacho's *Chinese Mexicans: Transpacific Migration and the Search for a Homeland 1910–1960* (2012), Jerry García's *Looking like the Enemy: Japanese Mexicans, the Mexican State, and US Hegemony, 1897–1945* (2014), and Selfa A. Chew's *Uprooting Community: Japanese Americans, World War II, and the US-Mexico Borderlands* (2015).

3. The publications dealing with orientalism in Latin America and the Caribbean include the following studies: Julia Kushigian's *Orientalism in the Hispanic Literary Tradition: In Dialogue with Borges, Paz, and Sarduy* (1991), Araceli Tinajero's

Orientalismo en el modernismo hispanoamericano (2004), Axel Gasquet's *Oriente al Sur: El orientalismo literario argentino de Esteban Echeverría a Roberto Arlt* (2007), and *El llamado de Oriente: Historia cultural del orientalismo argentino (1900–1950)*, as well as my edited volumes *Alternative Orientalisms in Latin America and Beyond* (2007), *One World Periphery Reads the Other: Knowing the “Oriental” in the Americas and the Iberian Peninsula* (2009), and *Peripheral Transmodernities: South-to-South Dialogues between the Luso-Hispanic World and “the Orient”* (2012). Many other books have been devoted to cultural production by and about Hispanic authors of Asian ancestry, including Debbie Lee-DiStefano's *Three Asian-Hispanic Writers from Peru: Doris Moromisato, José Watanabe, Siu Kam Wen* (2008), Rebecca Riger Tsurumi's *The Closed Hand: Images of the Japanese in Modern Peruvian Literature* (2012), Koichi Hagimoto's *Between Empires: Martí, Rizal, and the Intercolonial Alliance* (2013), and my *Imaging the Chinese in Cuban Literature and Culture* (2008), *The Affinity of the Eye: Writing Nikkei in Peru* (2013), and *Dragons in the Land of the Condor: Writing Tusán in Peru* (2014).

4. There are also numerous publications about the Asian presence in Peru, including Humberto Rodríguez Pastor's *Herederos del dragón: Historia de la comunidad china en el Perú* (2000) and *Hijos del celeste imperio en el Perú (1850–1990): Migración, agricultura, mentalidad y explotación* (2001), Mariella Balbi's *Los chifas en el Perú: Historias y recetas* (1999), Wilma E. Derpich's *El otro lado azul: Empresarios chinos en el Perú* (1999), and Isabelle Lausent-Herrera's *Sociedades y templos chinos en el Perú* (2000). Many other volumes have also been devoted to the Chinese presence in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Lok C.D. Siu's *Memories of a Future Home: Diasporic Citizenship of Chinese in Panama* (2005), Walton Look Lai's volume of essays *Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean* (2010), Rudy P. Guevarra, Jr.'s *Becoming Mexipino: Multiethnic Identities and Communities in San Diego* (2012), Kathleen López's *Chinese Cubans: A Transnational History* (2013), and Elliott Young's *Alien Nation: Chinese Migration in the Americas from the Coolie Era through World War II* (2014). And there are, of course, many other books dealing with Asian immigration in Latin America besides the ones quoted in this study, including C. Harvey Gardiner's *Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian Japanese and the United States* (1981); Roshni Rustomji-Kerns's *Encounters: People of Japanese Descent in the Americas* (1999); Lane Ryo Hirabayashi, Akemi Kikumura, and James A. Hirabayashi's edited volume *New Worlds, New Lives: Globalization and People of Japanese Descent in the Americas and from Latin America in Japan* (2002); Wannu W. Anderson and Robert G. Lee's edited volume *Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas* (2005); Cristina Rocha's *Zen in Brazil: The Quest for Cosmopolitan Modernity* (2006); Walton Look Lai's *Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar: Chinese and Indian Migrants to the British West Indies 1938–1918* (2013); and Eugenio Chang-Rodríguez's *Diásporas chinas a las Américas* (2015).

5. Bunkyo is an abbreviation of the Japanese name of the association, which means Brazilian Association of Japanese Culture and Social Assistance (*Sociedade Brasileira de Cultura Japonesa e de Assistência Social*, in Portuguese).

6. According to them, Asian Studies in Brazil began in the 1960s with the creation of research groups focusing on Africa, Asia, and the Middle East: “The first one was the Center of Afro-Oriental Studies (CEAO) in 1959 at the Universidade Federal de Bahia” (“O primeiro constituído foi o Centro de Estudos Afro-Orientais [Ceaó], em 1959, e ligado à Universidade Federal da Bahia” 11), which has published the *Revista Afro-Ásia* since 1965. In 1961, Altemani and Masiero add, the Brazilian Institute of Afro-Asian Studies (IBEAA) was created, and it was followed in 1973 by the Center of Afro-Asian Studies (CEAA) at the Universidade Cândido Mendes in Rio de Janeiro, which has published the journal *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* since 1978. In 1965, the Center of Afro-Asian Studies was founded in Natal and in 1977, the Brazilian Institute of Luso-Afro-Asian Culture, in Rio de Janeiro. Altemani and Masiero also reveal that it was at this time that Japanese-language courses began to be taught in public universities. Furthermore, at the Universidade de São Paulo (USP), the House of Culture of Japan, devoted to cultural events and studies, was founded. During the 1960s, the Department of History at the Universidad de São Paulo created the Oriental Studies section, which included a BA in Japanese. Still at the same university, the following decade saw the creation of the Department of Linguistics and Oriental Languages, later called Department of Oriental Languages and Department of Oriental Humanities. In the 1980s, the Study Group on Brazil-Japan Relations was established at the Universidade de Brasília and in 1989, the Center of Japanese Studies was formed at the Escola de Economia da Fundação Getúlio Vargas in Rio de Janeiro. In 1991, the Brazilian Society of Studies on Japan and the Pacific was created, which became, in 1998, the Brazilian Society of Studies on Asia and the Pacific. Altemani and Masiero add that in 1987, the Universidad de Brasília created the Nucleus of Asian Studies (NEÁSIA) as well as a BA in Japanese language and literature. In 1995, the University of São Paulo opened, at the Nucleus of Research on International Relations, a research focus on Asia. In 2002, the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul created the Brazilian Association of Japanese Studies (ABEJ). The Japan Foundation, which has its headquarters in São Paulo, has traditionally supported Japanese Studies in Brazil and elaborated a directory of researchers and institutions. In 2003, the Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) created a line for Japanese-language studies. The following year, Altemani and Masiero conclude, saw the creation of the Asia-Pacific Study Group at the PUC/SP.

7. Another Nikkei haijin, Roberto Saito, also observes that the first Brazilian author of Portuguese-language haiku was Afrânio Peixoto in his *Trovas*

Populares Brasileiras (Popular Brazilian Ballads, 1919), followed by Wenceslau de Moraes and his collection *Relance de Alma Japonesa* (Glimpse of the Japanese Soul, 1926) (Masuda 9). Waldomiro Siqueira Júnior wrote the first poetry collection exclusively composed of haiku, titled *Hai-Kais* (1933), but it was Guilherme de Almeida who popularized the haiku in Brazil, after adapting it to his own rhyme preference.

8. Masterson and Funada-Cassen quote one of the pioneers' poems, which reflects sacrifices made in their daily lives: "It is sad to see those who hurry to succeed and are sipping rice porridge like water" (77). He quotes it from *Masuji kiyotami* (13).

According to Lesser, "the *Shûkan Nambei* [South American weekly], founded in January of 1916, was the first of three newspapers published for Japanese and Japanese Brazilians, eighty percent of whom lived in rural areas. The *Nippak Shinbun*, founded six months later, published three times a week and claimed a circulation of thirty thousand by the 1920s" (157–58).

9. Yoshioka and Sam explain the etymology of the term, which is formed by the words *deru* (to leave) and *kassegui* (work), meaning to leave temporarily to work elsewhere (21).

10. "Imigrantes japoneses que chegaram ao Brasil ainda criança e que foram educados da mesma maneira como os nisseis" (Ono 142).

11. "É verdade que, com relação à contribuição na área agrícola, temos recebido uma alta cotação por parte dos brasileiros. E também se reconhece a contribuição de empresas japonesas ao desenvolvimento industrial do Brasil. Mas quanto à área cultural? Não tenho a pretensão de dizer que nada ou muito pouco. Os nipônicos e seus descendentes seriam capazes de deixar algo de que o Brasil pudesse se orgulhar perante o estrangeiro? Sinto certa tristeza ao procurar uma 'prova' da participação de japoneses na vida cultural brasileira que deixasse marcas" (196). Likewise, an anonymous critic writes in 1970: "Japanese immigration to Brazil began in 1908 and its contribution to Brazilian literature is still small. To date, no author of Japanese ancestry has done enough to merit citation or closer study by critics." ("A imigração japonesa para o Brasil começou em 1908. E sua contribuição para a literatura brasileira é ainda pequena. Até hoje nenhum autor de origem nipônica marcou sua presença de modo a merecer citação ou estudo mais atento da crítica" [back cover of the Editôra do Escritor edition of Eico Suzuki's (1936–) *Desafio ao Imortal*].)

12. "Ainda hoje prossegue ganhando divisas para o país. Até hoje sento orgulho de haver iniciado as negociações para a exportação do chá preto brasileiro" (18).

13. "A década de 1970 foi a era de ouro da famosa Cooperativa Agrícola de Cotia, que hoje já não existe. Na sua diretoria estava o Sr. Hifumi Ogasawara, uma pessoa

que enxergava longe, que sempre explicava aos agricultores jovens que o futuro da agricultura brasileira estava no cerrado” (Shindo, *Passos* 49).

14. The writer and politician Henrique Maximiano Coelho Neto defined the word *saudade* in a more poetic way: “A saudade é a memória do coração” (Saudade is the memory of the heart) (Albert et al. 239).

Teruko Oda is the author of poetry collections such as *Nos Caminhos do Haikai* (1993), *Estrela Cadente* (1996), *Janelas e Tempo* (2003), *Flauta de Vento* (2005), and *Furosato no Uta—Canção da Terra Natal* (2010).

15. “Até eclodir a Segunda Guerra Mundial, os imigrantes japoneses no Brasil se consideravam *nihonjin*, isto é, japoneses, uma vez que ainda havia perspectiva de retornarem enriquecidos ao Japão. Depois desse evento, eles passaram a construir suas vidas nas terras brasileiras, distantes da possibilidade do retorno. Até o período da guerra, a permanência no Brasil era tida como provisória. A guerra foi utilizada como o fator decisivo para não ter que acionar o argumento do insucesso do não-retorno de quase todos os imigrantes. A fixação definitiva no Brasil, que vinha ocorrendo há pelo menos uma década, é finalmente incorporada e aceita. A guerra foi o pretexto simbólico para legitimar o processo, que era inexorável, da permanência definitiva no Brasil” (103–4).

16. As Daniela de Carvalho explains, “Japanese officials interested in emigration, fearing that the emigrants would suffer because of cultural and religious differences, persuaded the emigrants to convert to Catholicism, arguing that it was the official religion of Brazil” (16).

17. The few Japanese-language memoirs and other texts analyzed here were all published in Portuguese translation.

18. “Jovens rapazes educados e especialistas qualificados na área agrícola e também em alguns setores da indústria. Houve, subsequentemente, uma migração de noivas japonesas para se casarem com esses rapazes e se estabelecerem nas terras brasileiras” (Sasaki 104).

19. “Jovens solteiros com nível educacional alto” (284).

20. “Democracia racial” (Racial democracy), a term derived from Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre’s (1900–1987) study *Casa-grande and senzala* (*The Masters and the Slaves*, 1933), has often been used to describe the purported absence of racism in Brazilian social relations. According to Freyre, the absence of racial prejudice in Brazil was due to close relations between masters and slaves before the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the supposedly benign nature of Portuguese imperialism. Racial democracy, often contrasted with racial discrimination in the United States, became a source of Brazilian national pride. Since 1974, however, Thomas E. Skidmore, Michael Hanchard, France Winddance Twine, Florestan Fernandes, and others have denounced this theory as a scheme promoted by the Brazilian state

and the white elite to camouflage racial discrimination and to prevent the creation of laws for its elimination. As a telling anecdote, on 2 October 2016 Brazil, the country with the largest black population in the Western Hemisphere (about half of its population), crowned Raissa Santana, only its second Miss Brazil of African ancestry since Deise Nunes won thirty years earlier. Santana was one of the six Afro-Brazilian contestants out of a total of twenty-seven.

21. “A imigração seria uma das salvaçãoes para conter a pobreza e a superpopulação do país” (20).

22. However, as Joshua Hotaka Roth points out, “A small number of Japanese unofficially entered Brazilian Amazonia from Peru to work as rubber tappers in the first years of the twentieth century” (21).

Perhaps the mistranslation of the Portuguese word *colono* leads Toake Enroh to erroneously write about “Japan’s approach to Latin America via emigration and colonization” (13) or “migration and colonization operations, mostly in Latin America” (69). Needless to say, no Latin American country was ever colonized by Japan.

23. “Deve-se lembrar que vinte anos antes usava-se aqui o trabalho escravo na produção. A mentalidade segundo a qual o trabalhador não passava de um homem inferior não se apaga em apenas vinte anos” (139).

24. Bandeirantes (literally meaning “those who carry the flag”) were, for the most part, seventeenth-century Portuguese settlers and their descendants in what is today the state of São Paulo, who led expeditions to the interior of Brazil in search of indigenous slaves (and later, of gold, silver, and diamonds).

25. Daniel Masterson points out that 72 percent of this population lives in the state of São Paulo and 26.6 percent in the city of São Paulo (246). Significantly, while in 1958, 55 percent of the Japanese lived in rural areas, by 1988 only 11 percent did (Masterson and Funada-Classen 246).

26. According to Tsugio Shindo, “Some were arrested over allegations that they were laughing in Japanese.” (“Alguns foram detidos com a alegação de que riram em japonês” [*Passos* 220].)

27. “Marcou o início da ‘crise cultural’ na colônia” (42).

28. “Assim, sofrendo maus tratos, meus pais, juntamente com todos os japoneses que viviam no litoral paulista, foram obrigados a abandonar suas casas. Os caminhos do exército deixáramos na estação de trem, no centro da cidade de Santos; em seguida, os japoneses partiram rumo à Hospedaria dos Imigrantes, em São Paulo, onde permaneceram alguns dias” (145).

Ana Suzuki also describes the displacement of Nikkeijin from the coast in her 1988 novel *Jônetsu: A Terceira Cor da Paixão* (1988):

“My uncle would say that they were given thirty-six hours, with no right to receive any new land. Many could not even carry their belongings.”

“And where did they go?”

“Aimlessly, in July’s chilly weather. The order was to back out at least fifty kilometers from the beach.”

“(—Meu tio contava que o prazo foi de trinta e seis horas, sem direito a receber novas terras. Muitos não conseguiram ao menos carregar seus pertences.”

“—E para onde foram?”

“Sem rumo, em plena friagem de julho. A ordem foi para que se afastassem pelo menos cinquenta quilômetros da praia” [37].)

29. The *Kasato Maru*, the ship that brought the first Issei immigrants to Brazil, was seized from Russia in Port Arthur in 1904 and incorporated to the Japanese fleet after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5). It was previously used to transport Japanese soldiers who had fought in Manchuria and to take Japanese emigrants to Hawaii, Peru, Mexico, and Brazil between 1906 and 1908 (Arai and Hirasaki 34).

30. As Walter Mignolo explains, “‘Internal colonialism’ is a concept that describes the mutation of imperial into national management in the ex-European colonies. What is ‘internal colonialism’ if not the persistence of the coloniality of knowledge (and therefore the control of authority and economy) under nation-building processes after decolonization? This is why coloniality remains as the hidden side of modernity, and why there cannot be modernity without coloniality” (162).

31. In Takashi T. Maeyama’s words, “The ‘revolution’ of 1930 led by Getúlio Vargas may be understood as the results of a populist coalition between the urban middle classes, including national industrialists, and the urban working class” (597).

32. “Não nos esqueçamos de que a tão celebrada ética de educação e do trabalho é muito menos uma tradição vinda de tempos imemoriais, do que um programa político voltado para a implantação do sistema capitalista e da centralização estatal durante a segunda metade do século XIX (Mita, 1992, 224–247). Essa ética serviu, ademais, como instrumento de dominação na colonização das regiões de Okinawa, Hokkaido, Coreia e Taiwan, onde os povos nativos eram obrigados a trabalhar para abastecer o mercado japonês, e estudar em escolas japonesas para esquecer seus costumes ‘bárbaros,’ tornando-se súditos dignos de pertencer ao ‘Grande Império Japonês’ (Oguma, 1998)” (Ernani Oda 104).

33. “Totalidade homogênea, imutável e exótica” (104).

34. “E a caixa ficou enterrada. Como se os livros estivessem mortos. Ou como se fossem tesouros?” (12).

35. “Na época, aos 49 anos de idade, Shioya-san mais parecia um forte e vigoroso jovem, disposto a trabalhar e contribuir para que o país continuasse crescendo e

progredindo. Sem dúvida, ele é um dos remanescentes daqueles que ajudaram a elevar o Japão ao nível de potência mundial, dando sua contribuição diária de suor e sangue. Foram milhões de braços fortes como os dele, de servidores dedicados, que reergueram uma nação reduzida a cinzas pelas duas bombas atômicas” (41).

36. “Le Noir veut être Blanc” (7). “Pour le Noire, il n’y a qu’un destin. Et il est blanc” (8).

37. See my *The Affinity of the Eye: Writing Nikkei in Peru* (2013).

38. Among many others non-Nikkei Brazilian *haijin*, one can include Waldomiro Siqueira Jr., Jorge Fonseca Jr., Oldegar Vieira, Abel Pereira, Guilherme de Almeida, Fanny Luíza Dupré, Luís Antônio Pimentel, Pedro Xisto, Fernandes Soares, Primo Vieira, Jacy Pacheco, Gil Nunesmaia, Martinho Bruning, Álvaro Cardoso Gomes, Dasso (Davidson Panis Kaseker), Alice Ruiz, Paulo Leminski, Olga Savary, Rodolfo Guttilla, Cláudio Feldman, Débora Novaes de Castro, Millôr Fernandes, and Sílvia Rocha (Masuda Goga 70).

39. *Haikai* refers to *haikai no renga*, a popular genre of Japanese poetry that developed in the sixteenth century out of the earlier aristocratic *renga* Brazil; however, it is often used as a synonym for haiku.

40. “A casa estava bem cuidada e não necessitava de reparos; mesmo assim, ela foi toda pintada na cor amarela, e as janelas e portas na cor verde” (177).

41. “Meus filhos, este é um momento muito difícil. O Brasil está em guerra contra o Japão. O sangue nos une, porém o dever nos separa. Vocês são cidadãos brasileiros e devem lutar pelo Brasil, se forem convocados para a guerra.’ Finalmente, disse para Kincas: ‘sirva sua pátria com orgulho e coragem”” (142–43).

42. The case of Brazilian jiu-jitsu is noteworthy. This martial art became independent from Japanese jiu-jitsu and judo thanks to Carlos and Helio Gracie’s experimentation and innovation, departing from the teachings of Mitsuyo Maeda (Conde Coma) in the Kodokan, the home of Judo.